

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USBERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 039882

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEC, UK

SUBJECT: VISIT OF FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR HIBBERT --  
HIGHLIGHTS

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1. REGINALD HIBBERT, FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN,  
EC NINE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, MET FEBRUARY 17 WITH ACTING  
SECRETARY HARTMAN AND EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARIES FOR  
REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ISSUES. HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE DIS-  
CUSSIONS FOLLOW. CYPRUS ISSUE REPORTED SEPTEL.

2. CSCE. HIBBERT THOUGHT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, IF

NOT PROPERLY HANDLED, HAD POTENTIAL FOR UPSETTING BELGRADE CONFERENCE. WHILE HMG WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT CURRENT FRG AND FRENCH ATTITUDES, BASIC EC NINE APPROACH TO BELGRADE -- LIKE THAT OF US -- WAS THAT THE WEST SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT. QUESTION WAS HOW TO PRESS SOVIETS ON BASKET III WHILE AVOIDING EXCESSIVE ABRASIVENESS AND CONSEQUENT BLOW-UP OVER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. TECHNIQUE USED FOR IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW,

ACCORDINGLY, WOULD BE CRITICAL TO WESTERN OBJECTIVES AT BELGRADE. THE NINE, WITH PRESENT EXCEPTION OF DUTCH AND FRENCH, WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF TWO-LEVEL MAIN CONFERENCE (I.E., PLENARIES AND COMMISSIONS) LASTING TWO TO THREE MONTHS. COMMISSIONS SHOULD BE FORUM FOR FRANK, PRIVATE DISCUSSION. BRITISH BELIEVE DUTCH WILL COME AROUND TO THIS VIEW AND THE UK, AS EC PRESIDENCY, INTENDS TO PRESS FRENCH TO DO SAME. THE FRG, PREOCCUPIED WITH BERLIN/GDR QUESTIONS AND OVERALL RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS, WERE PUSHING IDEA OF CONCESSIONS ON BREZNEV PROPOSALS IN RETURN FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT IN BASKET III AREA. HIBBERT FORESAW EVENTUAL EC NINE CONSENSUS ON ACCEPTING PAN-EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT CUT ACROSS ACTIVITY ELSEWHERE. FOR NOW, EC NINE EXPERTS HAVE NUMBER OF CSCE-RELATED STUDIES UNDERWAY. BRITISH HOPE THAT COMPREHENSIVE EC NINE APPROACH TO BELGRADE WILL BE DEVELOPED AT APRIL 18 POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING.

3. ON RELATED DEVELOPMENT, HIBBERT SAID A PUBLIC CSCE COMMISSION APPEARED TO BE IN THE WORKS IN BRITAIN. IT CONFIDENTIAL

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WOULD CONSIST OF DISTINGUISHED ESTABLISHMENT PERSONALITIES (GEORGE THOMSON, FORMER BRITISH EC COMMISSIONER WAS LIKELY CHAIRMAN) BUT WOULD HAVE NO OFFICIAL LINK WITH HMG. HIBBERT ALSO NOTED THAT

IN TERMS OF GENERAL UK APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION, THE FCO HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THERE BE A CLEAR "DIVISION OF LABOR." PUBLIC AGITATION ON BEHALF OF INDIVIDUAL CASES SHOULD BE TASK OF PRIVATE GROUPS; HMG SHOULD APPROACH BROAD POLICY QUESTION THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ENGAGE ITS PRESTIGE IN EACH INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIBBERT NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HOW USG DECIDED TO HANDLE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE WOULD INFLUENCE UK AND OTHERS.

4. BERLIN. HIBBERT STRESSED CONCERN OVER FRG'S APPARENT DESIRE ENERGETICALLY TO PURSUE BERLIN ISSUES IN GENERAL

AND THE EC ANGLE IN PARTICULAR. THE FCO BELIEVES THE QA IS

WORKING REASONABLY WELL AND THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO PUSH ON ITS "GREY AREAS." BERLIN IS NOT A MAJOR

PROBLEM AREA AT PRESENT AND BRITISH WISH TO KEEP IT THAT WAY. FRG, IN BRITISH VIEW, WANT TO USE EC AS "POINT MAN" ON BERLIN. THE PROBLEM IS THAT SOVIETS ARE NOT WILLING TO CONCEDE FRG RIGHT TO REPRESENT BERLIN ABROAD. GERMAN DESIRE TO FORCE ISSUE IN CONTEXT OF EC/CEMA NEGOTIATIONS IS NON-STARTER. EC/CEMA AGREEMENT DOES NOT OFFER SOVIETS ENOUGH TO CONCEDE ON REPRESENTATION ISSUE, AND LINKING OF ISSUE TO EC/CEMA WILL ONLY DELAY AGREEMENT AND PROVOKE NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION. FRG ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE BERLIN REPRESENTATION ISSUE INTO EC/SOVIET FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS WAS OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO HMG. THE UK NEEDS A FISHERIES AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR AND DOES NOT WANT IT PLACED IN JEOPARDY OVER BERLIN QUESTION. PROPER WAY TO MAKE POINT ON BERLIN REPRESENTATION, IN UK OPINION, WAS ON CONFIDENTIAL

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DIRECT ELECTIONS TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. THAT WAS SOMETHING THE SOVIETS COULD DO NOTHING ABOUT. HIBBERT ASKED THAT, WHEN EC/BERLIN QUESTIONS COME UP IN BONN GROUP CONTEXT, US NOT SUPPORT THE FRG POSITION UNTIL UK AND FRANCE HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO WORK THINGS OUT WITH GERMANS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HIBBERT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT US REVIEW ITS POSITION ON REFERENCE TO "EXISTING SITUATION" IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROTESTS ON EC QUESTION. REPEATED USE OF THIS REFERENCE WAS BEST WAY TO DEMONSTRATE TO FRG THAT OTHERS WERE BEHIND IT ON BERLIN REPRESENTATION ISSUE. US SIDE UNDERTOOK TO LOOK AGAIN AT ITS APPROACH IN THIS AREA.

5. IN FINAL POINT ON BERLIN, HIBBERT WARNED THAT ALLIES WERE MAKING MISTAKE VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS BY THEIR REFERENCE TO "QUADRIPARTITE STATUS" RATHER THAN "QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES" IN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH SOVIETS. THE FORMER PHRASE, FIRST USED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS AT MAY 1975 MEETING, HAS CREPT INTO OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS. THIS WAS FINE, IN BRITISH VIEW, IF WE WANTED A PUBLIC POLEMIC WITH SOVIETS. HOWEVER, THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT THAT FORMULATION AND ALLIES CAN DO NOTHING ABOUT IT. ALLIES SHOULD GET BACK TO "RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES", WHICH ARE UNDISPUTED, IN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH SOVIETS. US SIDE AGREED TO REVIEW HIBBERT'S THINKING ON THIS MATTER. DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE VIEWS OF EMBASSY BONN AND MISSION BERLIN ON HIBBERT'S ARGUMENTS.

6. USSR/EASTERN EUROPE. HARTMAN REVIEWED OBJECTIVES OF SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND EXPRESSED OUR DESIRE

FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH UK AND FRG ON DISARMAMENT AND MBFR

PRIOR TO VISIT. SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE WAS DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS.

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7. PORTUGAL. HIBBERT COMPLAINED THAT MARIO SOARES, DESPITE EARLIER WARNINGS FROM EC GOVERNMENTS, WAS ASKING FOR FORMAL RESPONSE TO PORTUGUESE MEMBERSHIP BY END OF YEAR, AND SAID UK WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER AN EARLY WELCOMING STATEMENT FROM EC MIGHT MEET SOARES' POLITICAL NEEDS, THUS REDUCING IMPORTANCE OF EARLY FORMAL RESPONSE. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST THAT UK TRY TO FIND SOME WAY TO PARTICIPATE IN NATO-WIDE EFFORT TO EQUIP THE PORTUGUESE BRIGADE, HIBBERT SAID HE WOULD ASK FOR ANOTHER LOOK AT THE MATTER.

8. SPAIN. HIBBERT WARNED THAT UK SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DO MUCH FOR SPAIN BEFORE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT INSTALLED, RULING OUT FOR EXAMPLE ROYAL VISIT TO UK FOR THE SILVER JUBILEE. HE POINTED OUT THAT UK PUBLIC OPINION WOULD EVENTUALLY FOCUS ON FACT THAT NEW SPANISH PARLIAMENT WAS NOT DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE CABINET.

9. GIBRALTAR. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT GIBRALTAR TALKS, HIBBERT SAID GOS WAS UNWILLING TO LIFT THEIR RESTRICTIONS OR OTHERWISE TRY TO ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR, SO HMG WOULD WAIT UNTIL NEW GOS COULD CONSIDER SUCH MATTERS. IN MEANTIME, HMG WOULD CONTINUE QUIET EFFORTS TO GET GIBRALTARIAN LEADERS TO THINK OF FUTURE RELATIONS WITH SPAIN.

10. MALTA. HARTMAN MENTIONED THAT MINTOFF PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN NATO. HIBBERT NOTED THAT ONE DIFFICULTY WAS MINTOFF'S DESIRE TO KEEP STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS MIXED TOGETHER, DESPITE FRENCH AND ITALIAN PROBES TO LEARN EXACTLY HOW MUCH MINTOFF WANTED.

11. US/EC PRESIDENCY DIALOGUE. HIBBERT RAISED ISSUE OF US DEMARCHE TO THE NINE ON MIDDLE EAST STATEMENT. FRENCH, AS WE KNEW, HAD REACTED SHARPLY. PART OF PROBLEM WAS FRENCH ASSUMPTION THAT UK HAD GIVEN US FULL TEXT OF PRO-CONFIDENTIAL

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POSED STATEMENT, I.E., US DEMARCHE IN PARIS WAS SO

SPECIFIC THAT FRENCH KNEW WE HAD TEXT. LOOKING AHEAD,  
HIBBERT STRESSED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AVOID  
KEYING OUR COMMENTS TO SPECIFIC EC NINE TEXTS AND POSI-  
TIONS PROVIDED TO US IN CONFIDENCE BY THE UK PRESIDENCY.  
WHILE IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT EVERY PRESIDENCY DID

THIS, THE FACT HAD TO BE OBSCURED IN ORDER TO KEEP PEACE  
WITH PARIS. IN PRESENTING US VIEWS, DISTINCTION WAS  
NECESSARY BETWEEN US INITIATIVES AND COMMENTS ON EC NINE  
POSITIONS UNDER DISCUSSION. THE LATTER REQUIRED MORE  
CIRCUMSPECTION. HIBBERT SUGGESTED -- AND WE AGREED --  
THAT IN FUTURE US VIEWS INTENDED FOR ALL THE NINE -- AND  
ON WHICH WE DESIRED A RESPONSE -- SHOULD BE SO FLAGGED.  
THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY WOULD SEE THAT THESE VIEWS WERE  
CONVEYED, ALTHOUGH RESERVING FOR ITSELF TO DETERMINE THE  
MANNER IN WHICH TO INTRODUCE THEM INTO EC NINE DISCUSSION.

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## Message Attributes

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